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CULTURE AND CUSTOM IN NATION-BUILDING:
LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 
Thomas Barfield*
I.  CULTURAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND
Afghanistan’s restoration of the rule of law has set in motion a renewed debate
about fundamental legal principles that has not been seen in the West since the time of
the Enlightenment: Who is justice for?  Who has the right to seek compensation or
justice?  Does the state or the individual have priority in seeking justice and delivering
punishment?  Is law a human creation or is it rooted in divine authority?  But it is a
debate without an audience in the international community that is assisting the Afghan
government in restoring its judicial system because the answer appears so self-evident.
Those from societies with long established systems of formal justice automatically
assume that it is an ultimate good, that surely everybody wants justice applied by the
state.  The Afghans who run the formal system assert the same.  But they have not won
over the population by any means since people, particularly in rural areas, are still
fighting out this issue politically and culturally: Is state authority a good idea?  Who
should set the terms of agreement?  Who should determine the rights and the wrongs?
This is because so many areas of Afghanistan have operated without (or outside
of) formal government institutions for a very long time; not just because of war, but
because that is the way things have always been.  For example, the assumption that the
state has exclusive sovereignty over criminal matters is not fully accepted by most of
the Afghan population.  Here the family still takes precedence, reserving the right to
take revenge or demand compensation when one of its members has suffered an
injury.1  Such injuries extend beyond physical damages to property or person and
include damages to a group’s honor that demand retaliation.  While Afghan govern-
ments formally reject such claims of personal justice, they have never been able to
extend the formal system to most of rural Afghanistan; the people there never relied
on state institutions and often took offense when the state interfered in what they
viewed to be personal matters. 
The diminished role of formal government institutions has had both positive and
negative impacts.  One positive impact, for example, is that anarchy has not been as
prevalent as one might expect at the local level even when government institutions
proved incapable of maintaining order.  People took matters into their own hands by
mobilizing one’s immediate relatives and larger kinship groups to get justice.  But for
state-building, it has had very negative consequences.  The Afghan population has
remained opposed to state systems of justice, which they see less as an extension of the
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rule of law and more as an imposition of central state authority.2  The dispute has been
central to the politics of Afghanistan for the past 150 years and has yet to come to
equilibrium.
II.  COMPETING SYSTEMS OF LAW
For over a century, successive national governments in Kabul have sought to
impose centralized code-based judicial institutions upon local communities that have
historically had their own informal institutions for regulating behavior and resolving
problems.3  While the content of these state-backed codes has varied significantly in
ideology, opposition to them has not.  More importantly, whenever the principles
embodied in such codes were successfully attacked as the products of foreign influence
that violated Afghan tradition, they sparked rebellions or civil wars that helped
collapse the regimes that imposed them.  The clearest example of this was the
challenge to the spate of reforms promulgated by King Amanullah to modernize the
Afghan legal system in the 1920s.4  Resistance to his new codes on the status of
women, identity cards, and family law helped topple his government in 1929 and
forced Amanullah into exile.5  Similarly, when a socialist party took power in a coup
in 1978, its decrees providing for radical land reform, equality for women, and
attempts to abolish existing rural debts and marriage payments provoked a new
conflict.  Within eighteen months, the Soviet Union felt compelled to invade
Afghanistan to keep the government from collapsing, leading to a decade-long
occupation and bitter war.6  Such opposition was not based exclusively on the secular
modernizing content of the new codes, but rather on the impact all such state-imposed
systems were perceived as having on Afghan society.  Thus, when the Taliban imposed
strict Salafist interpretation of Islamic law after seizing power in 1996, they too
provoked antagonism by championing a set of values that were as far from the Afghan
mainstream as those of Amanullah and the socialists had been (although opposite in
direction).7  Like them, the Taliban were seen as using state power to impose a rigid
legal system with foreign roots that ignored the country’s traditions and values.  
When a new government was installed in Afghanistan after the Taliban were
expelled in 2001, the international community appointed advisors (mostly European
and UN-based) to assist the government in Kabul in reviving the Afghan legal system.
For these advisers, the absence of formal legal institutions in most parts of the country
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was the clearest evidence that Afghanistan was a failed state in need of immediate
reconstruction.  Priority was therefore given to reviving Afghanistan’s old law codes
(drawn primarily from those implemented under the 1964 and 1973 constitutions) and
extending the reach of the judicial system nationally.8  The existence of competing
informal systems of justice and dispute resolution in local communities was viewed as
an unfortunate (if understandable) by-product of state collapse that would wither away
as the formal legal system expanded.  The new 2004 constitution, which vested almost
all political authority in a highly centralized government, buttressed this opinion since
it gave no recognition to such alternative institutions at the regional or provincial
level.9  Similarly, international observers, particularly NGOs operating in Kabul,
assumed that because previous Afghan governments had already signed most of the
standard international conventions and treaties guaranteeing such human rights as
freedom of religion and equal rights for women, bringing Afghan laws into conformity
with them would not be controversial.10 
However, these planners were not operating in a vacuum.  A quick review of
Afghan history would have shown them that implementing a system of nationally
applicable laws and courts was a state-building project that had never been successfully
completed in Afghanistan.  Renewing such a top-down process was sure to be
challenged and contested as an infringement on community autonomy.  And
challenging the formal legal system was a feasible option because the alternatives to
it were not wartime improvisations, but well-developed traditions with deep roots, both
tribal and religious.  These alternative systems better reflected local (particularly rural)
values and traditions than did the formal legal system, which was often attacked in the
past as a vehicle for introducing alien ideologies into the country.  For example, while
the protection of the individual rights guaranteed by treaties and conventions to which
Afghanistan is a signatory may have absolute priority for the international lawyers
advising the Afghan government, such agreements have no traction at the local level,
particularly when they concern religion, women, and family affairs.  Indeed, the values
that the Afghan state has pledged itself to uphold internationally are largely unknown
and unenforceable domestically.  Similarly, ordinary Afghans do not always see the
expansion of the formal legal system as a step forward in establishing the rule of law.
Historically, they had no role in creating the national law codes they are being asked
to accept now and view the whole judicial system as corrupt beyond repair.  
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Since the Afghan state is currently weak, it would be very risky to follow the path
of earlier governments and simply impose a formal legal system by fiat.  It can only be
rebuilt on a solid foundation if it takes into account the political and cultural
expectations of the Afghan people.  Opposition cannot be wished away and should be
dealt with through the political process.  Practical considerations make this even more
important.  At the best of times the formal system never handled any more than a small
minority of the legal cases that might seem to fall within its purview and always relied
on the informal system to fill that gap.  Given the small size of the Afghan court system
relative to the population, this situation will not change in the future.11  Therefore, it
is important to give legal recognition to the outcomes of informal dispute resolution
that is definitive but that does not compromise the rights of individuals to use the
formal system if they so choose.  Even in criminal matters where the government has
long claimed exclusive jurisdiction, informal systems remain vital to maintaining local
peace.  It is in this forum that aggrieved parties seek reconciliation in a process
designed to restore social harmony through such measures as compensation for loss,
public apologies, and pledges of amity.  
III.  SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE IN CONFLICT
The legal system in Afghanistan has historically been composed of three
competing parts: the state legal codes, Islamic religious law (sharia), and local
customary law.12  In contrast to most nations where state power has moved all other
contenders for legal authority to the margins or eliminated them, in Afghanistan the
power of each has waxed and waned.13  In some periods and places the religious or
customary sector has been dominant, while in other times and places the state has
forcibly imposed its power as it pleased.  In theory, each sector proclaims itself an
autonomous or even exclusive legal authority, but in practice no single sector has ever
been able to completely displace the others. Consequently, each sector has had to
adjust to limitations on power and authority.  The systems continue to interact in such
a way that any single legal dispute has the capacity to migrate from one sphere to
another and thus plays a large role in how an issue is ultimately resolved. 
Customary law is the means by which local communities resolve disputes in the
absence of (or opposition to) state or religious authority.  It is based on a common
cultural and ethical code that generates binding rules on its members.  Communities
use this unwritten code to resolve disputes, evaluate actions for praise or blame, and
to impose sanctions against violators of local norms.  While systems of customary law
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are found universally throughout rural Afghanistan, their specifics vary widely and
often idiosyncratically.  In addition, far from being timeless and unchanging, they are
subject to manipulation and internal challenges.  The most elaborate of these systems
is the Pashtunwali, the code of conduct for Pashtuns.14  It is an oral tradition that
consists of general principles and practices (tsali) that are applied to specific cases.15
What is most distinctive about the use of customary law is its insistence on using
community members, or respected outsiders chosen by the disputants, as fact finders
and decision-makers.  Both the system’s strength and weakness lies in its reliance on
mediation and arbitration to resolve problems.  It generally lacks the power of coercive
enforcement.  Failures to resolve serious problems, particularly those involving threats
of bloodshed, therefore often prompt state intervention.
Islamic religious law (sharia) in Afghanistan was implemented by trained religious
judges (qazi) following the Hanafi legal tradition.16  They were part of a larger class
of professional clerics (ulema) who issued opinions (fetwa) on religious issues.  They
saw themselves as protectors of a divinely inspired tradition in which religion and
government were inextricably melded.  As opposed to the highly localized systems of
customary law, sharia was believed to be universally applicable to all times and
places.17  Based on their training in a literate and urban tradition of orthodox Islam, the
ulema saw the rural customary law systems as illegitimate, particularly when they
strayed from classic Islamic practices.18  The ulema often used their influence to
demand the replacement of customary law practices with more standard sharia
interpretations, which of course then required the ulema to resolve disputes.19  Until
the formation of the modern Afghan state in the late nineteenth century, the ulema ran
the legal system independently, providing both the system of laws and the judges to
interpret it.20  This autonomy was progressively restricted through the secular reforms
of modernist rulers who demanded that the clergy recognize the state’s right to
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promulgate laws on its own and control the appointment of judges.21  After taking
control the Afghan state in the late 1990s, the Taliban abolished these national legal
codes on the grounds that the existing sharia system already filled the needs of Islamic
society.  While the Taliban’s rejection of this secularized state model marked the high
water mark of clerical influence, it proved a low ebb for Islamic jurisprudence.
Because the Taliban drew their high officials from poorly educated clerics rather than
the better trained ulema, they proved incapable of actually administering the
complexities of sharia law.22  
State legal codes draw their power from their claim to be the exclusive source of
legal authority that is enforceable on all people throughout the country.  Beginning
with the rule of Amir Abdur Rahman from 1880 to 1901, the Afghan state saw the
extension of its own law codes and judicial institutions as an application of state
sovereignty that it should not have to share with anyone.23  Initially, the state used
existing Islamic law but put the qazis on the state payroll, making them part of the
government.24  Subsequent rulers created independent state law codes and demanded
that qazis have state training and certification.  Such codes were always supposed to
be in accordance with Islamic principles, but the state asserted the priority of its own
laws over any applications of traditional sharia law where the two conflicted.25  Even
at the height of its power, however, the Afghan state never had the administrative
ability to enforce its writ nationwide.  While the central government refused to
recognize the legitimacy of customary law formally, officials in rural areas often found
it the best way to deal with problems in their districts.  Similarly, communities
employing customary law used the threat of going to the government courts as a way
to put pressure on reluctant disputants to accept their decisions.  The highpoint of the
state approach occurred under the rule of the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA).  In 1978 they removed religious symbolism from government to
create an overtly secular regime.  This move was so ill-received by the nation at large,
however, that the PDPA retreated to the old “conformity with Islam formula” in the
hopes of winning broader support after the Soviet invasion in 1980.26 
The social context in which these three elements play out is largely rural and
highly localized.  Historically, 80% of Afghanistan’s population lived in the country-
side in face to face communities.27  If all politics is local, then Afghan politics is local
and personal as well.  The social structure of communities is based either on the tribe
(where kinship relations determine social organization and basic political alliances) or
the locality (where people identify themselves in terms of common place).  Tribal
organization uses common descent through the male line to define membership and is
most characteristic of the Pashtuns and Turkmen who maintain elaborate genealogies
that extend back to a common ancestor.  Identification by locality is most characteristic
of the Tajiks, who have a common language (Persian) and sect (Sunni Islam) but make
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no claim that they share any overarching kinship links.  Among some groups that are
nominally tribal, such as the Uzbeks, only weak clan affiliation remains; while other
groups, such as the Hazaras, have a tribal structure, but are more likely to identify
themselves through their common Shia religion, which sets them off from their
neighbors.  Tribal peoples who move to the cities tend to lose their kinship links and
identify by locality over the course of a few generations.  Whether based on locality
or descent, Afghans call all of these groups qawm, a wonderfully flexible term that
indicates “us” as opposed to “them.”  Fellow qawmi can broadly include all members
of a large tribal or ethnic group, such as Pashtun, Hazara, or Tajik, or narrowly indicate
as few people as members of the same village or lineage.  It is among people of the
same qawm that customary law has its strongest force.
A.  Understanding the Strength of Afghan Customary Law
In a collection of studies of African political systems, Meyer Fortes and Edward
Evans-Pritchard contrasted societies with centralized governments with those that
lacked them.28  The first were characterized by “centralized authority, administrative
machinery, and judicial institutions—in short, a government—and in which cleavages
of wealth, privilege, and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority.”29
The second included “those societies which lack centralized authority, administrative
machinery, and constituted judicial institutions—in short which lack government—and
in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status, or wealth.”30  
Both types of systems can be found in Afghanistan within a single society.  The
urban areas of the country and the irrigated agricultural plains were under the control
of formal governments and their institutions.  The inhabitants of economically and
geographically peripheral areas in the mountains, deserts, and steppes historically
remained beyond the bounds of state control and therefore ran their own affairs.31  It
was both the lack of wealth and marginal location that characterized these areas that
made them unprofitable for the Afghan state to administer.  State control in these
regions was therefore often indirect or even non-existent.  While throughout the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the ability of the Afghan state to penetrate such
areas through roads, communication systems, and force of arms progressively
expanded, the level of local autonomy remained much higher than in other neighboring
countries.  In part this was because Afghanistan had avoided direct colonial rule by
European powers and because the country’s economy has remained largely subsistence-
based to the present day, conditions conducive to preserving local autonomy.  And
many areas, particularly among the Pashtuns in the east bordering Pakistan’s
autonomous tribal belt, the inhabitants were also armed and willing to resist
encroachments by the Kabul-based governments.
But how does a community preserve order and solve disputes in society without
government?  For people who depend on the state and its formal institutions to define
law and ensure its enforcement, the absence of government presents a major problem.
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In the view of the seventeenth century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes,
the absence of government or its collapse inevitably leads to anarchy and a war of
“every man against every man,” a condition he regarded as the worst of all possible
worlds.32  Thus, he concluded that the existence of a strong sovereign power was
necessary to achieve lasting social order and peace.33  Anarchy and social disorder
were greater dangers to the community than any tyranny.  Most governments in
Afghanistan have justified themselves using this Hobbesian bargain: they may be
corrupt, oppressive and unpopular, but they preserve order.  Failure in this primary task
invites replacement.  Islamic law supported this view as well, asserting that rebellion
against an established Muslim ruler by his subjects was illegitimate because it created
fitna (disorder, sedition, civil war) that was a greater danger to society than the worst
misgovernment.34  
Communities using customary law rejected the Hobbesian bargain because their
own experience had shown them that social order could be maintained in the absence
of government.  In their view, formal government institutions were not only
unnecessary but oppressive.  Here, law was based on a community consensus and the
preservation of order fell to individuals and their kinship or residential groups.  Bound
together by complex sets of relationships in face to face communities, the lack of
formal law codes or judicial institutions did not breed anarchy.  Instead, the freedom
of the individual to do as he pleased was restricted by his acceptance of a common
cultural code of behavior, the norms of which were enforced by the community
members at large.  The stress was on the equality of community members because all
power and jurisdiction was reciprocal; no one by right had any more power or authority
than anyone else.  It was expected that all community members would refrain from
invading each other’s rights and property, and from injuring one another.  In the event
of violations, however, everyone had a right to punish the transgressors himself and to
take appropriate retribution: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life.
Thus, instead of court prosecutions one had blood feuds that operated under specific
sets of restraints that defined acceptable limits of action.  It was to prevent the
emergence of such disputes, or to end those in progress, that communities developed
forms of mediation and arbitration designed to restore social harmony.  Indeed, the
worst punishment such a community could generally inflict on transgressors was not
death but permanent exile because it severed the individual from the community, a
form of social death. 
B.  The Process of Initiating and Resolving Disputes
Anthropologists examine sets of rules to understand how an informal legal system
works.  As outlined by K.N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, there are three ways
to look at such rules: 1) rules as abstract principles, 2) rules as actual behavior, and 3)
rules as principles derived from legal decisions in cases of hitch or trouble.35  For
Pashtuns, it is the Pashtunwali that is the source of abstract principles.  Rules that
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generate behavior embody the notion of “doing Pashto,” that is, enacting cultural
values in the real world where they take on specific forms.36  The specific set of rules
that are derived from and employed in legal cases and dispute resolution are known as
tsali (trail marker) in Pashto.37  It is the last area that is most concrete because actions
taken by individuals (or proposals for action) become subject to public judgment.
Alef-Shah Zadran provided one of the best descriptions of how this system operates
in an unpublished dissertation that focused on dispute settlement among the Zadran
Pashtuns in the Paktia Province of eastern Afghanistan during the government of
President Mohammad Daud from 1973 to 1978.38 
Disputes among Pashtuns are traditionally said to arise from the three “Z”s: zar,
zan, and zamin (gold, women, and land).39  Unlike state criminal codes that impose
fines (paid to the government) and imprison wrongdoers, Pashtun customary law seeks
compensation for the wrong done and social reconciliation, not the punishment of the
perpetrator.40  The easiest problems to solve are those small disputes in which judges
must simply assess liability for damage claims to property or set compensation for
personal injuries that have an accepted value.  While this system of justice may be
unwritten and informal it has a specificity that would impress even a practicing tort
attorney, as evidenced by the two tables of compensation from the 1970s listed below:
Table #1: Bodily Injury Compensation Schedule41 
Body Part Injured Level of Compensation ($1=50 Afs)
Right eye 7,500 Afs
Left eye 7,500 Afs
Right ear 5,000 Afs
Left ear 5,000 Afs
Nose 30,000 Afs
Middle incisor 5,000 Afs
Side incisor 3,500 Afs
Canine 2,500 Afs
Premolar 2,000 Afs
Molar 1,000 Afs
Hands 15,000 Afs
Right hand 10,000 Afs
Left hand 5,000 Afs
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Fingers
Thumb 3,750 Afs
Index 2,500 Afs
Middle 2,000 Afs
Ring 1,500 Afs
Pinky 1,000 Afs
Feet 15,000 Afs
Right foot 7,500 Afs
Left foot 7,500 Afs
Amputation of foot 30,000 Afs
Fingernails or toenails (visible) 150 Afs
Fingernails or toenails (not visible) 100 Afs
Table #2: Farm Injury Compensation Schedule42
Type of Tree Level of Compensation ($1=50 Afs)
Apple 1,000 – 2,000 Afs
Apricot 500 – 1,000 Afs
Pomegranate 100 – 300 Afs
Walnut 1,500 – 2,000 Afs
Mulberry 1,000 – 1,200 Afs
Willow 500 – 1,300 Afs
Type of Animal Level of Compensation 
Camel 10,000 – 20,000 Afs
Ox 3,000 –   7,000 Afs
Cow 2,000 –   5,000 Afs
Donkey 1,000 –   2,000 Afs
Sheep 1,000 –   3,000 Afs
Goat 600 –  1,000 Afs 
In addition to seeking compensation that will make a victim whole (to the extent
that is possible), Pashtun customary law also attempts to make the offender publicly
and personally accountable for his deeds.43  The community can therefore demand that
the wrongdoer apologize publicly to the victim and make payments for sharm (shame).
Sharm is a payment, usually consisting of one sheep and 500 Afs., that recognizes the
social damage done to the honor of the victim.44  Upon receipt of the sharm payment
the victim slaughters the sheep and invites the neighbors, the village mullah, and the
offender and his family to the subsequent feast.45  The offender offers a public apology
at this time.46  This is expected to end the dispute and bring the community back into
harmony.  
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More disruptive are those cases that generate a demand for retaliation or revenge
(badal) because here an individual seeks personal retribution for wrongs done against
him or his kin group, particularly in cases of murder.47  There is the obvious desire to
punish the person who committed the act by the victim’s family, but it also involves
questions of honor and personal responsibility.  Not seeking retaliation personally is
deemed a sign of moral weakness, even cowardice, not just of the individual who was
wronged, but his whole kin group.  It is this right and expectation of retaliation that lies
at the heart of the Pashtunwali as a non-state legal system.48  Kill one of our people
and we will kill one of yours; hit me and I will hit you back.  While the community
may recognize that acts such as theft, homicide, or rape are wrong, unlike the state, the
community does not take collective responsibility for judging or punishing people who
commit such acts.  This is a right reserved to the victims.  However, the Pashtunwali,
local tradition, and public opinion do play a large role in structuring how, on whom,
and where one may take revenge legitimately.  It also lays out mechanisms for
resolving such disputes through mediation or arbitration.  Communities exert
considerable social pressure to end disruptive disputes, particularly in blood feuds
where successive cycles of revenge attacks can only be brought to an end by the
intervention of outside intermediaries. 
Although associated with lawlessness in the popular mind, blood feuds are hedged
by a large number of rules designed to limit their destructiveness.49  For example, the
first question that must be answered is whether or not a death falls within the blood
revenge category.  If the death results from an accident or is involuntary, the victim’s
family may be entitled to compensation but not revenge.  Blood revenge may also be
prohibited if the victim was engaged in a dishonorable act during the commission of
a crime, such as a thief killed in the night or a man caught engaged in adultery.
Personal blood revenge cannot be taken in time of peace for a man killed in battle
because the fight was group against group, although if hostilities are renewed then each
side tries to even the score.  Finally, since blood revenge is the obligation of a kin
group, a man who kills his brother is not subject to revenge (since the murderer would
have to take revenge on himself) but he would have to flee the community.  Revenge
should ideally be directed at the murderer alone, but under some conditions the
Pashtunwali makes his brothers or other patrilineal kin legitimate substitute targets.
Women and children are excluded as targets of revenge in all cases.  The person taking
the revenge should be a close relative of the victim and the most honorable revenge
attacks take place face to face.  Killing in ambush is also acceptable as long as the
revengers take public credit for their deed.  Revenge attacks cannot be carried out in
a mosque or against a guest.  The goods and weapons of a man killed in a revenge
attack cannot be robbed and his relatives should be given quick notice of the death so
that they can recover his intact corpse for burial.  
Taking revenge is often no easy task, particularly if the murderer is from a
powerful family and the victim’s kin group is weak.50  If revenge cannot be carried out
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the victim’s family will often leave the village to avoid the public shame of having to
live in proximity to the killers.  Such unresolved cases may linger for years and hang
over the communities like uncollected debts.  The most classic of these cases involves
the responsibility of blood revenge falling on young boys whose fathers’ deaths remain
unavenged.  Upon reaching adulthood many years later they return to kill their
enemies.  The long period that may elapse between an offense and its resolution is
recognized in a number of Pashtun proverbs; for example, a “Pukhtun waits for a
century to take revenge and says, ‘I took it quickly.’”51  
The choice of taking blood revenge or other retaliation lies with the individual, but
once a potentially violent dispute enters the public realm the community can intervene
by sending its own intermediaries who ask for a truce and attempt to begin
negotiations.52  It is hard for the individual to refuse such a truce, particularly when it
is proposed by men of influence or in the name of religion.  However, this intervention
is only likely to occur if the community fears that the dispute will create wider waves
of social disruption that need to be controlled.  In this respect, episodic revenge-
homicides may be less disruptive than disputes over the boundaries and the uses of
community controlled forestland or pasture, which can provoke warfare between rival
groups.  But once a cycle of killing begins, blood feuds between hostile kin groups can
last for generations if left unresolved.53  For this reason, communities usually attempt
to intervene to end the dispute by getting the parties to agree to a settlement before
another death occurs.  Although in violation of both national and sharia laws,54 giving
women in marriage as part of a settlement between the feuding parties was common
and justified because it bound the formerly estranged groups by new marriage ties.55
However, because settling too quickly may impugn the honor of the victim’s kin group,
they are often reluctant to accept any settlement unless the mediators address this
problem.56  
IV.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE LEGAL CODES AND ISLAMIC 
LAW IN RURAL AFGHANISTAN
A.  State Legal Codes
The relationship of the Afghan state legal system to local communities employing
their own forms of customary law was historically problematic and often contradictory.
In theory, state law has always applied to all residents of Afghanistan equally; but in
practice, government institutions were found almost exclusively in urban areas and in
provincial centers of administration.  The latter’s direct control rarely reached beyond
the limits of the towns where local officials were stationed.  Even so, under strong
central governments, the state attempted to expand its reach and had clearly become
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the dominant force in Afghanistan by the 1970s because of its ability to intervene in
local affairs if it chose to do so.57  This high water mark quickly receded during the
decade-long struggle to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan that ended in 1989 and
receded even further during the civil war that erupted upon the fall of Najibullah’s
government in 1992.
State legal codes and formal administration had the greatest impact on local
communities during the establishment of the modern Afghan state in the reign of Amir
Abdur Rahman from 1880 to 1901 and during the period of intensive state-building
from 1950 to 1978 under Zahir Shah and Daud Khan.58  State control was weak or
absent in periods when the power of the central government declined, such as in the
wake of the civil war that toppled King Amanullah in 1929, when local communities
regained their autonomy.59  However, even during periods of strong state-building, the
power of customary law was circumscribed rather than destroyed.  In part, this was
because the state used these systems as a form of indirect rule in areas where they
lacked the administrative capacity to rule directly.  It proved very useful for local
government officials to rely on the informal system to maintain general peace and
order.  Only when disputes threatened public order, involved criminal activity, or were
reported to the government for action, did the state normally intervene.60  
The state system was most at odds with the informal system in the area of criminal
law.  The Afghan state attempted to end blood feud and other forms of private justice.61
The state proclaimed exclusive jurisdiction in such matters on the grounds that these
crimes were offenses against the community at large and deserved to be punished as
such.  There was also a strong equity argument to be made, that only the state had the
capacity to protect the weak and powerless against abuse by stronger members of the
local community who might otherwise commit crimes against them with impunity.
Rural communities, however, still viewed the Kabul government with suspicion
because in practice state legal authority was embodied not just in state appointed
prosecutors and judges but in executive officials appointed by the central government,
such as provincial governors, district administrators, and the police commandants who
ran the Gendarmerie-Provincial Police.  All of these executive officials had the power
to detain and jail people for various lengths of time.  Thus, local officials, without
reference to the courts, decided many cases that one might expect would be judged in
the formal legal system.  This was hardly surprising given the small size of the Afghan
judiciary: in 1972, it consisted of only 679 judges and assistant judges and dealt
primarily with serious crimes or significant property cases, particularly where the
court’s control of land registration made it the deciding player.62  In Afghanistan, a
country the size of France that in the early 1970s had a population of at least 12 million
people, this formal legal system was very thin on the ground.  This was particularly
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true in the country’s 209 sub-provincial districts where the primary courts were
located.63  Most of Afghanistan’s small judiciary was concentrated in the capital,
Kabul, where the Supreme Court resided, and only major provincial cities had
secondary courts.
Because residents of rural Afghanistan generally considered government officials
of all types corrupt and oppressive, there was a strong desire to avoid both government
officials and the formal legal system.  This fear of becoming involved with a
government process was one of the strongest tools that local mediators and arbitrators
had at their disposal when enforcing decisions rendered by the informal system.  If the
parties refused to accept a negotiated settlement they would be threatened with the
imposition of the formal judicial process.  This was usually enough of a threat to gain
compliance.  But in many cases, local officials actually aided the process by jailing the
disputants or their relatives until they agreed to arbitration in order to maintain the
peace in the districts.  In other cases, they acted as self-appointed arbitrators to resolve
a problem without resort to formal adjudication.  Unfortunately this was often done by
demanding bribes to make a problem disappear.  As one cynic informed me, a fair
judge was one who demanded bribes equally from both parties so that he could then
judge the case impartially.  The state system also had a cultural barrier to surmount,
particularly in Pashtun regions where seeking government help was considered a sign
of weakness, evidence that the kin group was unable to take revenge honorably them-
selves.64  Even when state authorities did arrest and jail the offender, such punishment
by a government criminal court did not erase the obligation to take revenge.  The
victim’s family was expected to kill the murderer once he was released from prison
unless there was a settlement to end the feud before that time.  
B.  Islamic Law and Rural Afghanistan
Throughout the twentieth century there was an unresolved battle at the national
level between modernists and Islamists over the Afghan legal system that involved
replacing an exclusive dependence on sharia law with statutory law.  The most
contentious areas of legislation involved changes in family law that attempted to
restrict brideprice, set minimum age for marriage, and revise the rules for divorce.65
Conservative clerics often used these changes, actual and proposed, as a way to
mobilize opposition to governments in Kabul.66  For this reason historians have
generally assumed that the people of rural Afghanistan were the natural allies of the
conservative clergy in support of Islamic law.67  The most widely cited example was
the opposition to King Amanullah’s reforms in the 1920s that resulted in rural revolts
that eventually toppled his regime.68 But since his family law code was never
implemented in the rural areas, opposition to it was almost purely theoretical.  What
rural Afghans tended to resist, and what Muslim clerical opponents could effectively
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play upon, was the imposition of direct control by the Kabul government, whether that
took the form of taxation, conscription, or the imposition of a new legal code.69  But
in this struggle, sharia law was not the champion of old rural traditions. Instead, it
defended the state’s right to tax or conscript its subjects as it pleased and rejected the
right to rebellion against a Muslim ruler even when his acts were abusive.70  Indeed one
of the few things that proponents of state and sharia law could both agree upon was
that customary codes or institutions should have no role as part of the judicial system.
Until the 1964 Constitution unified them and gave precedence to statutory law in
the combined system,71 the Afghan legal system had two types of courts: those that
administered sharia law and those that administered statute law.72  But even the codes
authorized by the 1964 Constitution in the unified system often just restated sharia law
interpretations in the form that was easier to use by judges.73  This involved laying out
crimes and their penalties clearly by statute, but then declaring that any gaps be
covered by Hanafi interpretation of sharia law.  Persian translations from standard
Egyptian and Ottoman juristic manuals provided the source material for use in sharia
law,74 a translation project that was never completed for the entire code.  By making
this material available in Persian, judges no longer needed be competent in Arabic, an
advantage the Islamic clergy previously had over other groups. The code proved to be
less a replacement of sharia and more a modified version of it tailored to avoid
controversy.75  However, because combining the administrative and sharia courts into
a single system affected only the top two levels of the judiciary (provincial Secondary
Courts and the national Supreme Court), these changes had little impact on rural
Afghanistan:
Since the reorganization of the judiciary in the 1960s did not affect the then existing
structure of the primary courts, the jurisdiction of these courts remained largely
unchanged in their capacity as the courts of first instance for ordinary civil litigations
and crimes.  Thus the primary court remained essentially a court of sharia jurisdiction
in much the same way as they were before the Constitution of 1964.76
As a product of a literate and sophisticated urban Islamic milieu, sharia law had
developed procedures for properly evaluating evidence, deciding cases in a consistent
manner, and justifying decisions by reference to Hanafi fiqh (science of jurispru-
dence).77  When used by the state court system, however, there was often a poor fit
between its procedures and the needs of illiterate rural Afghans.   First, while custom-
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ary law was part of an oral tradition in which any competent adult could participate,
state law courts demanded written documents and citation of specific laws to bring a
case.  Litigants therefore needed to employ specialists who had formal training in
sharia law and court procedures.  Second, state law courts (like most formal legal
systems) were overly focused on process as opposed to substance.  Appeals in a case
could move it from the local Primary Court to a provincial Secondary Court or the
national Supreme Court in Kabul where technicalities could tie the process in knots.
Third, the use of sharia law by state courts was often at odds with rural traditions,
particularly the right to blood revenge, payment of brideprice, marriage exchanges to
end blood feuds, denying property inheritance to women, and punishment of crimes
like adultery.  Fourth, the exclusive use of the Sunni Hanafi tradition of sharia by state
courts completely ignored the practices of the country’s Shias (about 15% of the
population) who had their own legal schools.
The process problems were perhaps more important than the content problems.
For example, rural Afghans often ignored the gap between sharia law and local custom
because they often assumed (incorrectly) that there was none.  Surely, they thought,
their own local traditions must be in accord with Islamic law because they themselves
were such good Muslims.  Indeed, given the high rates of illiteracy in Afghanistan and
weak training in Arabic even among educated clerics, too few of them actually knew
just what sharia law actually required. And since the judges assigned to the lowest
level Primary Courts usually had only basic training in sharia law themselves, they
were as often swayed by arguments drawn from local tradition as from Hanafi fiqh in
deciding cases.78  Thus, while the dispute at the national level focused on the content
of the law, at the local level people focused on its administration.  Whether based on
the sharia or government legislation, the courts of all types were still viewed as tools
of the central government that allowed the state to interfere in local affairs. 
V.  THE IMPACT OF 20 YEARS OF WARFARE ON TRADITIONAL 
SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Over the course of the anti-Soviet war (1979-1989), and more thoroughly during
the Afghan civil war (1989-2001), the state institutions of successive Kabul
governments withered.  In many parts of the country, formal government institutions
ceased to exist.  While this reinvigorated the autonomy of local communities, there was
a change in their political organization in which the old domination of rural life by
large landowners and traditional tribal leaders gave way to a new class of younger
military commanders who also took on the responsibility of civil administration.79  It
also produced the rise of new representative institutions such as village shuras,
assemblies that were designed to represent local communities.80  While these had been
common in Pashtun areas as jirgas, such collective assemblies were new to other parts
of the country.  At the same time, the power and influence of the Islamic clergy
(ulema) rose sharply compared to pre-war Afghanistan, particularly when it came to
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administering religious law (sharia) in the absence of central authority.81  The
influence of the clergy peaked with the Taliban, the only clerical movement ever to
seize power in Afghanistan.
During the Soviet war the central government lost direct control of most rural
regions but maintained its power in the cities.  Because rural Afghanistan had such a
strong tradition of customary law and enforcement based on self-help, the withdrawal
of government institutions such as the police did not lead to anarchy.82  People were
already used to solving their problems without resorting to the government.  Instead,
the withdrawal of government institutions increased the power of local assemblies
(jirgas and shuras).  Military commanders also began to play an important role in
community life.83  As leaders of resistance groups, this emerging class of younger men
from less prestigious social backgrounds filled the vacuum left by the departure of the
old khans.  In order to get arms and money, these commanders needed to be affiliated
with one of the seven recognized political parties in Pakistan that had a stranglehold
on such resources (except for the Shia Hazaras who were dependent on Iran).84  While
most of these parties had an Islamist agenda (particularly Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami),
the commanders who affiliated with them represented their own regions and qawms for
whom such overarching ideologies were of little importance.  Hence the formal party
structures and their agendas had little influence on local affairs in most rural areas.85
While most Afghan villages had a local mullah, these men generally had only a
minimal amount of education and were considered employees of the community so that
they had little prestige or political influence.86  Educated clerics with advanced
madrasa education (malawi) who could serve as qazi were far rarer in the countryside.
And because for almost a century the government in Kabul had attempted to control
the appointment of qazis by making them salaried employees, those who did serve as
judges were part of the formal government administration.  As the government
withdrew from the countryside, however, an ulema independent of the Kabul regime
grew up.87  Some were former government judges who had quit the regime, while
others were men who had not previously held formal positions but had the training to
fill them.  These clerics took advantage of the networks created by the political parties
in order to gain clients through which they could impose themselves and sharia law on
areas controlled by the resistance.  They did this in part by arguing that fighters in a
jihad, or holy war, were under the obligation to obey religious law and give it primacy
over customary practices.88  In the absence of strong political personalities, such
unarmed clergy who preached the supremacy of God’s law came to have real power
over resistance commanders who feared their influence.  From the point of view of the
local community, such religious figures often served the useful purpose of restraining
military commanders from taking arbitrary actions that would benefit themselves and
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their relatives.89  However, as David Edwards relates in an account of the early anti-
government uprisings among the Safi Pashtuns of Kunar, this often came at the price
of sacrificing Pashtunwali practices and their replacement with orthodox sharia.90  
Over time, religious figures used their positions as judges to create an autonomous
legal system employing sharia law but outside of a formal state structure.91  In some
respects this was a return to pre-modern Islamic legal practices in which judges were
largely independent of the state because law was derived from religion and not
legislated law codes.  This meant that, although state power and prestige was in decline
or absent, a legal framework remained.  Indeed, an impression that struck Olivier Roy
forcefully during his many visits to mujahidin-controlled areas in the 1980s was the
importance of law in organizing social relations, and the increased power of the ulema
in bringing sharia law to rural areas.92  With the exception of the areas where strong
adherence to Pashtunwali still prevailed, the ulema had taken responsibility for
handling almost all civil affairs.  Even without the state, a court system survived and
flourished.  Where there were sufficient ulema, they maintained both primary courts
and courts of appeal.93  Indeed, the judiciary in some respects was actually more
independent and respected than it had been under pre-war central government control.
The mujahidin commanders, while not constrained in their political or military
actions against other armed forces (including both Kabul regime forces and other
mujahidin groups), found themselves bound by the legal rulings of the ulema in their
dealings with the civilian population:
The local people always have the right to make a complaint to the qazi against any
abuse of power, such as theft or brutality on the part of the resistance.  Few resistance
leaders would be willing to defy the judgement of a [malawi].  The parties forming
the resistance movement have no power to nominate a qazi, who are co-opted from
among the [ulema] who have received legal training in a madrasa.  The Afghan
resistance probably takes more care than any other comparable movement to ensure
that the civilian population receives fair treatment, a policy which has contributed to
the considerable degree of support they enjoy.94
This respect for law extended even to the treatment of enemy captives and possible
spies.  Summary execution was rare because such an arbitrary action was likely to
provoke a blood feud with the man’s kin whose loyalties always superseded political
affiliations, and because determining guilt was the prerogative of the qazis, not military
commanders.95  Roy observed an example of this in 1982 in Herat when the resistance
detained a man they suspected of being a government spy.  When the man attempted
to escape he was captured and beaten.  The next day his relatives brought a case before
a qazi accusing his mujahidin captors of torture.  A commission of inquiry consisting
of four judges interviewed both the prisoner and mujahidin, with additional testimony
from the prisoner’s relatives (who were living in government controlled territory).
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After investigating and deliberating for two weeks, the judges reminded the resistance
fighters that Islamic law prohibited any form of torture but also found the prisoner
guilty of being a government agent.  He was then executed.96
Why, one might ask, did sharia courts become more popular and accepted during
the Soviet war than they had been previously?  One reason was that, even though the
previous government courts at the local level had been based on sharia principles, the
procedures, corruption, and unreliability of those previous courts (as we noted earlier)
had made them unpopular.97  By contrast, in mujahidin areas they had come to play a
positive role.  They were viewed as bulwarks against the tyranny of the powerful that
offered at least four advantages over the justice system previously employed by the
central government: first, sharia norms were more in harmony with rural Afghan’s
religious view of the world than government legal codes; second, the qazi of the
resistance movement was more accessible than its government equivalent and usually
not as corrupt; third, court proceedings in both civil and criminal cases were conducted
orally in a way that was understood by everyone; and, finally, cases were disposed of
quickly.98
It was no surprise that sharia law and the ulema who interpreted it began to play
a larger role in society.  In many respects, this form of sharia law began to take the
place of customary law in non-Pashtun regions.  Given the informality of its
administration and lack of deep legal training for most of the judges who administered
it, this law was in many ways a type of customary system itself.  This would become
apparent when the Taliban attempted to implement what they saw as “true Islamic
law,” the hallmarks of which were harsh punishments and narrow legal reasonings that
were previously alien to Afghanistan.99
One of the great weaknesses of mujahidin-administered sharia law was that it
applied only to civil affairs.  It had no power to bring an end to the political violence
that plagued the country.  Battles between local commanders, rival parties, and ethnic
groups remained all too common, and no one had the power to put an end to the
fighting.  The withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989 actually increased the power of
local armed factions because the Najibullah government attempted to retain its power
by winning such factions away from the Pakistan-based mujahidin parties.100  The
government offered them weapons, money, and autonomy in exchange for their
participation in the regime’s rural militia.  And with the Soviets gone, Najibullah was
able to portray the Kabul regime as just another Afghan faction.101  Only after the
Soviet Union collapsed, bringing an end to the flow of money, food, and weapons that
sustained the regime, did Kabul fall to the mujahidin forces in April 1992.  The
collapse of the government led to a civil war in which the factions organized
themselves on regional and ethnic lines, with none of them able to displace the others.
The chaotic conditions in the Pashtun south and east opened the way for the emergence
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of the Taliban, a Salafist religious movement that promised to restore order by
implementing a stern version of Islamic law.
The Taliban never created a clear administrative structure.  Political power was
vested in a new Kandahar-based shura of Taliban clerics who followed the lead of
Mullah Omar whom they promoted to the rank of Amir-ul-Momenin, Commander of
the Faithful.102  This gave him supreme executive power.  In his rhetoric Omar often
harked back to the days of early Islam for the model of society he wished to see
installed in Afghanistan.103  His stock answer to every legal question was that the issue
was adequately addressed by the sharia, without ever referencing the many issues that
were still subject to long debate within the different legal schools of Islam.  This
insistence on imposing sharia law without being clear on its details or sources was a
hallmark of Taliban fiqh. 
The rest of the Islamic world had little respect for the Taliban interpretation of
Islamic law.  For example, in 2001 a set of high-ranking Egyptian clerics personally
visited Omar in Kandahar and attempted to convince him that Islamic law did not
require the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas.  After his refusal to heed their advice,
they were scathing in their opinion of Taliban legal reasoning, stating that,
because of [the Taliban’s] circumstances and their incomplete knowledge of jurispru-
dence they were not able to formulate rulings backed by theological evidence.  The
issue is a cultural issue.  We detected that their knowledge of religion and jurispru-
dence is lacking because they have no knowledge of the Arabic language, linguistics,
and literature and hence they did not learn the true Islam.104
Omar responded to this (and other) rebukes for his destruction of the Buddhas by
ordering the sacrifice of 100 cattle and giving the meat to the poor to express his regret
for not having destroyed the monuments sooner.105
The Taliban proved as keen as the Communist PDPA in using state power to
enforce an alien worldview on the Afghan population.  The movement’s religious
orientation was strongly influenced by conservative Salafi sects of Islam that had their
origin in Arabia and the local Pashtunwali.106  The influence of the latter was only
indirect because, as a movement led by clerics, the Taliban was opposed to the tribal
system and as well as customary law.  But because most of the leadership was trained
in rural Pakistani madrasas that could not provide advanced religious training in
Arabic, they too easily conflated Pashtun tribal culture with religious law.107  For
example, executions of murderers could only be authorized by a sharia court, but at
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the public execution itself the victim’s family was given the opportunity to shoot the
prisoner personally, a combination of Islamic punishment and blood feud revenge.
Similarly, their severe attitudes toward the seclusion of women seemed more strongly
rooted in rural Pashtun life than interpretations of religious law.  Indeed, the Taliban’s
only innovation in government was the creation of a powerful new and Saudi Arab-
inspired Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.108  This ministry was
home to the religious police who forced people to pray, checked that men had long
enough beards, and beat women who violated Taliban rules on dress or movement.
The Taliban’s religious controls extended to bans on music, dance, films, kite flying,
chess playing, card games, and other forms of popular entertainment.109  The longer
they ruled, the more unpopular the Taliban became with ordinary Afghans.  This
perhaps explains why they were so quickly driven from Afghanistan when the
Americans invaded in 2001.  
VI.  PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS FOR REINSTITUTING FORMAL JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN A POSTWAR AFGHANISTAN AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS
A.  Legal Authority
The choice of what constitutes binding legal authority and the relationship
between religious law and government codes at the national level has been contested
in Afghanistan for well over a century.  Under the mujahidin and Taliban governments,
Islamists who proclaimed that sharia law had controlling status came to dominate the
judiciary.  Today they are eager to see this power continue by demanding that sharia
law be made the controlling legal standard.  If this were done it would give the ulema
the power to determine what was, or was not, in conformity to Islamic law and there
would be no way to override their decisions.  For this reason modernists are deter-
mined not to have sharia law recognized as the controlling legal standard.  But in
opposing the Islamists the modernist strategy has been oblique:  not to oppose the
sharia directly but simply to proclaim that, as a Muslim nation, Afghan government
would of course have no laws that were not in conformity with sharia.  In this the
modernists play on an old Afghan belief that a government composed of good Muslims
is by definition an Islamic government and would do nothing that was not Islamic.
They also make the argument that in order to include Afghanistan’s Shiites (who
employ the Ja’afari interpretation of sharia) the state has an obligation to work out a
law code that is acceptable to all groups in the country, regardless of sect.  This is
reflected in the 2004 Constitution, which requires the Afghan laws to be in conformity
with the Hanafi interpretation of sharia but also makes an exception for the Shiites to
use their own codes.110  More importantly, because it does not provide a clear
mechanism for resolving whether state laws are in conformity with sharia, it effectively
allows the government to legislate without fear of a religious veto.  Because the state
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controls the appointment and payment of judges, it also has the capacity to exclude
those who disagree with this point of view from the formal system of justice.  Such a
process has already begun in 2006 with the replacement of the conservative Supreme
Court, which had been staffed by Taliban sympathizers, by more state oriented
technocrats.
B.  Reconstructing the Legal System
My own discussions with officials from the Supreme Court, prosecutor’s office,
police, and other representatives of the formal judicial system in Kabul beginning in
September 2002 revealed a surprising complacency about the structure of the judiciary
and its implementation of the law.  They all defined reconstruction as bringing back
the same three-tiered court structure (district, province, capital) that existed in the
country for most of the twentieth century without examining whether this model still
served the country’s needs.  More confounding was their common insistence that (a)
the system was already completely up and running, (b) that its size was adequate for
handling all of Afghanistan’s legal problems, and (c) that the formal system alone was
all that was needed.  None of these statements stand up to scrutiny, but neglecting the
importance of the informal system is particularly egregious because it is unlikely that
any formal legal code (of whatever origin) can take precedence in the countryside
where government authority and institutions are weak on the ground. 
The refusal to address the role of informal dispute resolution in maintaining order
in rural Afghanistan reflects a long tradition, however.  Successive Afghan govern-
ments have all opposed the formal recognition of customary law institutions.  By
prohibiting special courts, Article 55 of the 1923 Constitution was the first to explicitly
deny recognition to tribal methods of adjudication.111  In part this was because the state
wished to assert its exclusive right to make laws and execute them.  Tribal jirgas and
other local dispute resolution mechanisms were seen as obstacles to achieving this
goal.  Ideology had little to do with this; both the Communists and the Taliban wished
to implement universal law codes (though obviously of very different types).
Currently, as a result of the devolution of power and their closer connections with the
customary law tradition, it appears that members of the judiciary are more open to the
recognition of customary law by the court system.112  In the Supreme Court, judges felt
that such an arrangement would reduce their workload to a more manageable level,
although some lawyers were concerned that any recognition of customary practices
might reduce the status and prestige of the formal system and its agents.  By contrast,
Ministry of Interior officials opposed incorporating any customary law institutions,
arguing that all disputes should be settled through the formal system.113  
Formalizing an informal system, however, presents a number of obstacles.  First,
customary law is not a single set of rules that can be collected and codified for simple
application.  Rather, it encompasses sets of principles and rules that are tailored to
370 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2
114. See generally SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: “CUSTOMARY” LAW ON
KILIMANJARO, 1880-1980 (1986). 
115. See BARFIELD, NOJUMI & THIER, supra note 11, at 18-20.
specific contexts that are used to seek reconciliation rather than adjudication.  It is this
very flexibility and sensitivity to local social relations that make it so effective.  To the
extent that such systems are codified and used in adjudication by outsiders, they simply
become an alternate form of law.  British colonial policies in Africa, where they often
attempted to determine land rights by codifying customary practices, had the
unintended consequence of freezing the system and producing a new arbitrary set of
rules that were now enforced by the government rather than the local people.114
Second, it is the desire to avoid government institutions and its agents that encourages
people to use the informal system.  In its most successful outcome the government
should never become aware that a problem arose in the first place.  Giving the
government a role in formally recognizing the customary system would also mean that
the government would become a player in it.  The desire to keep the government at
arm’s length by denying it access to a community’s problems makes this outcome
undesirable.  Third, giving the government the power to enforce the rulings of local
jirgas or shuras would mean they would become bodies that adjudicate disputes.
Currently such bodies serve either as either mediators or arbitrators that must first get
the cooperation of the parties to begin their work but ultimately lack the coercive
power to enforce their decisions.  It is this very lack of coercive power that pushes the
players to come to an acceptable compromise agreement instead of standing on
principle.  Allowing the government to enforce a jirga’s decision would also mean that
its enforcement moves outside the community itself.  Finally, customary law in
Afghanistan is not restricted to civil disputes but also handles criminal cases such as
murder, theft, and assault.  It is not clear that any state would be willing to cede power
to enforce criminal codes to customary institutions publicly, although in practice many
criminal complaints are resolved in this manner.
One way out of this dilemma would be to reestablish “courts of reconciliation”
similar to those briefly established by King Amanullah in the 1920s.115  Those courts
served as a filtering device because no civil case could be lodged in a local district
primary court until attempts at mediation or arbitration through a court of reconcilia-
tion had failed.  Because their decisions were not subject to review by upper level
courts, the voluntary agreements that these courts ratified did not have to be uniform
or in accord with either state law codes or orthodox sharia practices.  If the old courts
of reconciliation were restored, then this would be a way to recognize acceptable
customary law outcomes without making the state the main actor in the process.  Nor
would a judge in such a system necessarily be required to have formal legal training
since his rulings would not apply to other parties or other judges.  While such a court
could be used to negotiate settlements by hearing complaints that had not been
previously resolved, its more common function might be to serve as the place where
solutions already derived through the customary system could be formally recognized.
For example, evidence that a property dispute had been resolved by a tribal jirga could
be presented to such a court and given legal imprimatur so that an individual’s land
rights were better secured.  Similarly, the reconciliation of an inheritance dispute that
might meet local norms, but was in violation of some sharia principles, could be made
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legally enforceable without setting a precedent for all other such cases.  Because
parties to a civil dispute would still have access to the formal court system if they could
not reconcile, no one would be forced to accept a “customary law solution” unless they
were willing to be bound by it.  Nor in such a system would state actors have the
responsibility of defining what was, or was not, the application of appropriate
customary law.
VII.  INTEGRATING INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN AN AFGHAN CUSTOMARY CONTEXT:
THE CLASH OF TWO GOODS
Customary law seeks to solve problems in a way that will end a dispute and be
seen as fair by the local community.  Without deep knowledge of local norms,
practices, and community sentiment, however, it is difficult for outsiders to have a role
in such a system; although in some cases, as outsiders, they may be seen as potentially
more fair decision-makers than insiders.116  Of greater difficulty is how to deal with
cases in which the norms and expectations of the local community violate
internationally accepted standards embodied in an ever-wider series of conventions
designed to protect human and civil rights that are presumed to be universal (or at least
applicable to signatory nations).  
Normally in a country with a sovereign and functioning government, potential
contradictions between competing norms are mediated by the state.  The state may
adopt new policies and through its legal system change how its people act at the local
level by enforcing the new standards.  Or, all too commonly, a state may join its
international brothers in Geneva to sign an international treaty that endorses some lofty
aims that are then ignored at home if there is likely to be substantial opposition.  This
can be done either by failing to incorporate the treaty’s provisions into the country’s
body of legislation or by approving some legislation that is then left unenforced.
However, when the international community takes charge of a failed state and attempts
to rebuild its judicial institutions, it is faced with this problem directly.  Its agents,
more than any others, are responsive to criticism that they should be instituting
international norms and practices.  But at the local level these same agents encounter
defenders of customary practices and cultural values who are just as keen to see that
their own prerogatives be respected.  These defenders of local practices cite an equally
praised principle that customary systems deserve protection and respect because they
embody unique local cultural values.
In Afghanistan this dilemma is at one remove: the actual administration of justice
remains under the control of the Afghan state (such as it is) and foreigners serve only
as advisors, albeit powerful ones.  Therefore, most of the focus has been on ensuring
that the new constitution and law code are in accord with international standards set
out in treaties and conventions that previous Afghan governments have ratified.117
Influencing changes in state law codes, however, does not guarantee compliance at the
local level where such codes compete with ulema interpretations of sharia law and
community based customary law.  In addition, sharia law is often in conflict with
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customary practices.  The most difficult questions raised about the disjuncture between
these three systems are whose values should prevail and at what cost.  
Historically, the most dramatic conflict among the three systems is over the rights
of women.  Between 1920 and 1992 Afghanistan’s national government, under various
regimes, attempted to improve the status of women through changes in the law and
their own policies.  National law codes attempted both to reform sharia law practices
and change or abolish customary ones.118  Opposition to these reforms came from
conservative religious scholars who rejected the state’s right to interpret religious law,
and from local communities hostile to any form of outside interference.  Although to
outsiders the alliance of rural communities and Islamist clerics seemed a natural one,
it was not.  Islamist clerics also opposed customary law institutions, including blood
feud, exchange of women in marriage to resolve disputes, bride price payments, and
exclusion of women from inheritance rights, as much or more than the Kabul govern-
ment, and they had more influence to change them at the local level. 
Under the mujahidin government that succeeded the PDPA, and more dramatically
under the Taliban, the rights of women in the national law codes were abolished in the
name of bringing state law in conformity with sharia law.119  Although the Taliban
asserted that its draconian policies that removed women from the workplace and
required them to be veiled were simple applications of religious law, sharia legal
experts in other Islamic countries disagreed.120  However, in the Afghan countryside
the emphasis on enforcing sharia often increased women’s rights to inheritance and
control over marriage that were denied to them under customary practices.121  And the
social restrictions that were so widely resented in the cities provoked little opposition
in the countryside because they reflected commonly accepted rural values and life-
styles.
The Karzai government marks a return to state law codes as the controlling law
of the land.  While it has been much more receptive to the values reflected in inter-
national norms and conventions, it too is limited by Afghan cultural sensitivities on
many issues.   For example, freedom of religion in Afghanistan is usually interpreted
by the Afghans as the right of all Islamic sects to be treated equally and without
prejudice.  Implementing this Afghan definition would be a great step forward for the
country but is far below international standards for freedom of religion.  It does not
include the right of other religions to have equal status with Islam or to permit
proselytizing for other religions.  Almost all Afghans consider apostasy as a crime for
which the death penalty is fully justified, forcing the Karzai government to get the
offender quickly out of the country in rare cases that have become publicly known.122
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Similarly, the international pressure to give greater emphasis to women’s rights
puts the government in a difficult position.  The most successful changes in the country
have been done gradually by beginning in Kabul and other major cities and then
working outward.  Governments like those of King Amanullah or the PDPA that
demanded rapid universal changes found that this undermined their political power
because they were accused of abandoning true Afghan values.123  For this reason, the
international community needs to work for the broad acceptance of universal principles
that bring equality of status to women, protect the rights of ethnic and religious
minorities, and ensure human rights more generally in the new constitution of
Afghanistan and its laws.  At the same time, it needs to realize that within Afghanistan
the recognition of such rights is still politically contentious.  Most western democracies
that subscribe to high goals admit that achieving them remains a work in progress.
How should it be otherwise in a country like Afghanistan that is recovering from two
decades of war and the disastrous implementation of unworkable policies by the
Communist PDPA and the Islamist Taliban? 
The international community has difficulty integrating customary institutions that
are by definition variable, informal, and not easily codified with the formal
bureaucratic institutions upon which the international peacekeepers normally rely.
However, because (unlike in the former Yugoslavia or East Timor) international forces
in Afghanistan are largely confined to Kabul, and only in a security role, they are not
confronted with the problem of deciding whose farm is whose or protecting the rights
of one ethnic group from attacks by another.  Instead, the major role of the inter-
national community has been in aiding the reconstruction of the Afghan state.  As has
been demonstrated throughout this Article, the writ of the Afghan state has always been
limited although its influence has had periods of strength and weakness.  One reason
that Afghan society has survived so many years of turmoil has been its ability to govern
itself at the local level even in the absence of state institutions.  The international
community should take advantage of this strength by recognizing that most problems
are not solved in the formal judicial institutions but rather informally.  Some ways of
keeping order, such as blood feud, will never be acceptable and should disappear as
state authority expands.  Others, such as the use of jirgas or shuras to hear local
disputes, are grassroots democratic institutions that should be encouraged.  But
precisely because such institutions give priority to the community over the individual,
disputants should always have the right to the formal legal system where they can get
a hearing by (hopefully) more dispassionate judges, or demand enforcement of their
rights though national law codes that apply to all citizens equally.  It perhaps goes
without saying that western legal codes recognize the validity of mediation and arbitra-
tion and provide means by which their decisions can become binding.  Perhaps the
West’s resistance to customary law is simply a product of labeling—customary law is
just mediation and arbitration in another guise, and therefore should be encouraged as
such.
